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Abstract
In this paper our objective is to analyze sustainable debt policy rules and economic growth
using a model of endogenous economic growth theory. For the government it is possible to run
into debt, but, the primary surplus is a positive linear function of the debt-to-GDP ratio which
guarantees that public debt is sustainable. We analyze different sustainable debt policies in
this small open economy model of endogenous growth with public capital accumulation, as
well we take transitions into account. We investigate the characteristics and stability of the
steady state and we analyze the effects on welfare for the different debt policies.
∗I would like to thank Alfred Greiner and Christiane Clemens for the inspiring ideas and the support
received in various meetings. I am indebted to António Afonso, Matthias Schön, Paolo Pasimeni and other
participants for very competent and detailed comments during the INFER Workshop on New Challenges for
Fiscal Policy which helped to improve the paper.
1 Introduction
The financial crisis that began as a sub-prime crisis in the USA in 2007 and turned into a
public debt crisis led to deep economic recessions and to a drastic increase of national debt-
to-GDP ratios in some countries. In the euro area, the crisis is still far from being solved:
Public debt affects the evolution of market economies, several EU members cannot repay or
refinance their government debt and economies are reliant on the support by other countries.
The recent dispute on the draft budget between Italy and the EU Commission shows that
fiscal policy is still a challenge for Europe and that there are still frictions and pressure among
the Member States of the EU and European countries in general.
Even the countries participating in the European Economic and Monetary Union that have
signed the Maastricht treaty which states that the public deficit and the public debt relative
to GDP must not exceed 3% and 60% to ensure compliance with budgetary discipline, these
countries had, and a part of them still have problems with their debt service and some even
had to be bailed out by the European Stability Mechanism to prevent bankruptcy (Greiner
& Fincke, 2015). During the crisis, different approaches have been implemented such as
counter-cyclical expansionary fiscal policy in the US and in Europe, countries embarked on
austerity, pro-cyclical policies that aimed at lowering sovereign debt and the interest rate
(Arčabić et al., 2018). The EU reaction to the crisis was the introduction of strong fiscal con-
solidations under the surveillance of the European Commission. Expenditure cuts, notably
lower public investments, led to a reduction of public deficits. The debt reduction benchmark
announced by the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)(also called “Six-Pack”) in
December 2011 states that Member States whose current debt-to-GDP ratio is higher than
the 60% threshold must curtail the distance to 60% by an average rate of one-twentieth per
year (Morimoto et al., 2017). The reason for this is the thought that persistent budget deficits
lead to problems for the economy and the government, especially due to the government’s
borrowing associated with a budget deficit that “crowds out” private investment spending
and decreases long run growth of the economy. Financial pressure on the government’s future
budgets and the debt sustainability are problems that occur due to these deficits (Huang
et al., 2017). Accordingly, the medium- to long-term growth rate is the smaller the higher
the public debt of a country. However, this does not mean that deficit-financed public in-
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vestments always lead to low growth rate. It depends on the public investments. Productive
public investments ensure a rise of GDP and as a consequence a rise in tax revenue which will
reduce the long-term debt-to-GDP ratio. Therefore the rise of the debt-to-GDP ratio due to
the deficit-financed public investments is only temporary.
The empirical literature is controversial about the effect of high public debt-to-GDP ratios.
On the one hand, economists such as Checherita-Westphal & Rother (2012) identify that the
effect of public debt on economic growth is hump-shaped which means that up to a certain
threshold, higher public debt-to-GDP ratios go along with higher economic growth, however
after this threshold, there is a negative correlation between public debt and economic growth.
An important contribution in this context was the paper by Reinhart & Rogoff (2010) who
stated that a debt-to-GDP ratio of over 90 percent has a significant negative impact on long-
run economic growth, which gained attention and initiated a debate in research and policy
(Arčabić et al., 2018). On the other hand, there exist empirical studies that do not find that
nonlinear effect. Panizza & Presbitero (2014) study the negative correlation between public
debt and economic growth, however the effect of debt on GDP depends on the structure and
accumulation of debt and the link between debt and growth disappears when they correct
for endogeneity. Fincke & Greiner (2015) describe a statistically negative effect for developed
countries, but the relation between debt and economic growth is satistically positive for fast
growing developing economies. Based on the empirical studies, the relation between public
debt and economic growth seems to be negative for developed economies, although there is
not a high effect and especially the effects are different between countries. Arčabić et al.
(2018) illustrate a survey of empirical studies that aims at analyzing the effects of public debt
on economic growth or the other way around. Hence, empirically, there is no final clarification
how public debt impacts economic growth.
In our paper, we do not want to focus on debt thresholds, but rather is our objective to
analyze sustainable debt policy rules (Balanced Government Budget and Permanent Public
Deficits) and economic growth using a model of endogenous economic growth theory. Fiscal
sustainability means that the government is able to repay its debt at some point in the future.
In this context, an important aspect for the so-called golden rule of public finance is the inter-
generational redistribution. Our analysis starts with the intertemporal budget constraint of
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the government to which the government must stick. Then, the primary surplus (ratio) plays
a crucial role. The rise of public debt in an economy implies an increase of future primary
surpluses to fulfill its intertemporal budget constraint. When the government does not raise
the future primary surpluses, it accepts a default that can be followed by social turbulences
which can be a danger for the political system. Raising taxes, reducing public spending or
a rise in GDP that leads to more tax revenues can lead to higher primary surpluses and can
prevent social tubulences. Naturally a combination of these three measures is also possible
to raise the primary surplus. Raising taxes and reducing public spending can have a negative
impact on the economy’s growth rate. This means that the government stimulates growth if
it reduces public debt relative to GDP. We concentrate on public spending and public rev-
enues and neglect in this paper the central bank of an economy since normally governments
should not count on money creation by central banks that raises the money supply and leads
to a higher inflation rate to reduce the real value of public debt because central banks are
independent and assisting in pursuing sustainable debt policies is not one of their main tasks
(Greiner & Fincke, 2015).
In our paper, it is possible for the government to run into debt, but, the primary surplus
relative to GDP is a positive linear function of the debt-to-GDP ratio which guarantees that
public debt is sustainable. This concept is based on the tests by Bohn (1995). The economic
intuition behind it says that if governments run into debt today they must take corrective
actions in the future by increasing the primary surplus. If the government does not act in
this way, public debt will not be sustainable (Greiner & Fincke, 2015). The crisis led to a
renewed twofold interest in governments’ reaction to the debt accumulation dynamics: Cer-
tain theoretical and empirical papers (Bohn, 1995, 1998; Fincke & Greiner, 2012; Greiner
et al., 2006) tried to support the existence and the sign and size of this reaction. Whereas,
in other papers the nature of governments’ reactions to the accumulation of debt in terms of
sustainability was of higher importance (Beqiraj et al., 2018). The optimal degree of fiscal
policy responsiveness to rising public debt and changing macroeconomic conditions induced
intense discussion and diverging views. Bohn (1998) stated that fiscal consolidation in case
of a rapidly increasing public debt level is an approach to restore fiscal sustainability. Other
authors, nevertheless, studied the risks of dampening economic activity and of facing fiscal
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fatigue (Ghosh et al., 2013a,b), in particular large and sustained fiscal consolidation to ensure
sustainability (Eichengreen & Panizza, 2016). Fiscal reaction functions and its use in fiscal
sustainability analysis currently gained noticeable attention. Among others, Ghosh et al.
(2013a,b) used fiscal reaction functions to estimate public debt sustainability thresholds and
public debt limits (Beqiraj et al., 2018). In this context, it is also crucial to investigate the
policy behavior. After illustrating the cointegration of the public debt-GDP ratio and the
structural primary surplus, Beqiraj et al. (2018) identified a sort of general empirical law of
policy behavior valid for the OECD countries where the long-term governments’ reaction to
the accumulation of debt in terms of sustainability is negative. This means that fiscal policies
are not sustainable. However, in the short term, when the output gap is positive, the policy
makers interfere with a new deficit and debt, though it does not establish a symmetrical
correction for the reversed situation. This may be taken as evidence for politicians, at least
in most OECD countries considered, to have rather a short-sighted perspective. The short-
sighted perspective of politicians can be explained by the politician’s will to be re-elected.
Nevertheless, the present rules and behaviors of fiscal and monetary policies should focus on
asymmetrical long-sighted monetary and fiscal policies.
As explained, during the crisis, some economists recommend to cut back the size of the public
sector and reduce the government debt for countries holding large external debt and with low
rates of economic growth. As a consequence, more private initiative and investment should
boost the rate of economic growth. These austere policies would lead to a smaller foreign
indebtedness and thus a reduction in foreign debt service. In the long run this cut in the
ratio of government debt to domestic income could cause more private consumption. How-
ever, the literature does not offer a logically consistent model that is able to explain these
arguments. As an example, a balanced-budget rule was critised by Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe
(1997) who show that such a rule can be destabilizing because it generates indeterminacy
and expectations-driven fluctuations, in a neoclassical model where expenditures are financed
with distortionary income taxes and labor income tax rates are endogenous. Even if there
is a substantial and expanding literature on endogenous growth (Romer, 1986; Barro, 1989),
there is a lack of explanations of the effects of budgetary policies for economic growth in
open econonomies (van der Ploeg, 1996). As in reality, the private sector and the government
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are able to lend and borrow their assets in the foreign capital market, countries like Greece,
Italy, Ireland, and Portugal hold large levels of debt and thereof as well large external debt.
Hence, it is crucial to analyze the sustainable debt policy rules in a model of an open economy
(Morimoto et al., 2017). The literature states some results of the analysis of open economies.
van der Ploeg (1996) analyses a small open economy with overlapping generations of house-
holds, investment with adjustment costs, externalities in production, a stock market, and a
risk premium on foreign debt and shows that supply-side shocks generate a positive correla-
tion between foreign indebtedness and the rate of economic growth while demand-side shocks
cause a negative correlation between these variables. Alogoskoufis (2014) demonstrates that
openness results in higher steady state growth and a negative net external position if the
world real interest rate is lower than the real interest rate under autarky and the other way
around. Turnovsky (1996a,b) analyzes a representative household endogenous growth models
and shows the existence of a balanced growth path for a small open economy only if the world
real interest rate is equal to the pure rate of time preference plus the growth rate of domestic
output, a crucial knife edge condition. Elsewise domestic output and domestic consumption
grow at different rates. This is often a problem, if either capital market imperfections are pos-
tualted (Barro et al., 1992), or by assuming an endogenous labor supply (Turnovsky, 2000).
Alogoskoufis (2014) investigates a simple endogenous growth intertemporal model of a small
open economy, with adjustment costs for investment and overlapping generations. Huang
et al. (2017) propose that integrated world capital and goods markets can be important for
the stabilization of the economy, if the government counts on changes in income tax rates
to achieve budget balance. Futagami et al. (2008) analyze productive public spending and
public debt in an endogenous growth model where government debt has to converge to a
certain exogenously given debt ratio asymptotically. Morimoto et al. (2017) investigate this
model for a small open economy and indicate that sufficiently low debt-to-GDP ratios can
avoid indeterminate equilibrium paths. In the model, endogenous limit cycles can emerge.
As in Greiner & Fincke (2015), in our paper, the government invests in a productive public
capital stock that has positive externalities on goods production and raises aggregate pro-
duction possibilities. Futagami et al. (1993) and Turnovsky (1997) show the positive effects
on private goods production of public capital accumulated through public investment. Other
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studies on public debt finance in endogenous growth models in which the inputs for private
goods production are government services or public capital analyze the policy impacts of pub-
lic debt finance on equilibrium dynamics, long-run growth, and welfare (Greiner & Semmler,
2000; Ghosh & Mourmouras, 2004; Greiner, 2007, 2012; Yakita, 2008)
Here, the expenditures of the government are financed by levying an income tax and by is-
suing bonds. We investigate the effects of different sustainable debt policies in this small
open economy model of endogenous growth with public capital accumulation, where the gov-
ernment can borrow from abroad to finance its debt, on the dynamics of the economy with
respect to the characteristics and stability of steady state and with respect to welfare. The
economy in this model consists of three sectors: A household sector, a productive sector and
the government. Our small open economy does not follow an independent interest rate policy
and in the long run, on the SBGP, it does not have an influence on its rate of economic growth.
We define economic growth as the medium-to long-term development of GDP. Therefore, we
do not analyze the short-term impacts of a government’s debt policy, as after Keynes they are
used for smoothing economic fluctuations. Therefore, we assume that all markets are in their
equilibrium, in particular the labour market with a natural employment rate. We analyze the
welfare effects on the sustainable balanced growth path of the different scenarios. Further-
more, we examine the welfare effects along the transition path, that is the effects resulting
from a transition from one scenario to the other scenario. Our aim is to answer the question:
Is in this model a sustainable balanced government budget worthwhile? Which effects do
transitions from one scenario to the other scenario have on welfare? What are the different
macroeconomic consequences of these different sustainable debt policies?
In section 2, we introduce the model and present the model structure by explaining the house-
hold, the productive sector and the government. Further, we illustrate the model dynamics by
describing the equilibrium conditions and the (sustainable) balanced growth path. In section
3, we analyze the two different debt policies, Balanced Government Budget and Permanent
Public Deficits, on the SBGP. In 4, we study the welfare effects on the sustainable balanced
growth path of the different scenarios and along the transition path. Section 5 summarizes
our results.
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2 Model Structure and Model Dynamics
The structure of our model is essentially the same as in Morimoto et al. (2017), considering a
small open economy model of ongoing growth with public capital accumulation. The economy
consists of three sectors: A household sector, a productive sector and the government. For the
production of a single final good, labor, private capital and public capital (infrastructure) is
used. Private capital and the final good can be traded freely between the countries. Though,
public capital cannot cross border and migration of individuals is not possible. For the
construction of social infrastructure, public investments of the government are necessary.
First, we describe the household and the productive sector.
2.1 The household and the productive sector
The household sector is represented by one household, a representative household that max-
imizes the discounted stream of utility arising from per-capita consumption, C(t), over an
infinite time horizon subject to its flow budget constraint(, taking factor prices as given).
The population size is normalized to one and the household inelastically supplies one unit
of labor, L(t), at each moment of time. The maximization problem of the household can be
written as 1
max
C
∫ +∞
0
(
C1−σ − 1
1− σ
)
e−ρ·t dt, (1)
subject to
Ȧ = (1− τ)I − C. (2)
ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the household’s rate of time preference or the subjective discount rate. The emer-
gence of the parameter σ in the utility of the household reflects the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of consumption. The household’s income is denoted by I = r ·A+ w, where r is
the world interest rate, w is the wage rate and A is the asset holdings of the household. The
asset holdings are classified into three types of assets, private capital (K), government bonds
(B) and foreign assets (FA), hence A = K + B + FA. FA < 0 means that some fractions
of private capital or government bonds are owned by foreign agents. As shown in equation
1From now on we omit the time argument t if no ambiguity arises.
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(2), the government imposes a constant tax on the household’s income, τ ∈ (0, 1) which
takes the residence base form meaning that nonresidents’ income is not taxed. A must satisfy
the no-Ponzi game (NPG) condition, limt→∞Ate
−r·t ≥ 0. The dot gives the derivative with
respect to time and we neglect depreciation of (private) capital. The household maximizes
equation (1) subject to equation (2). To solve this problem we formulate the current-value
Hamiltonian for this optimization problem written as
H =
(
C1−σ − 1
1− σ
)
+ λ((1− τ)(rA+ w)− C), (3)
where λ is the co-state variable or the shadow price of asset holdings. The necessary optimality
conditions are given by
C−σ = λ, (4)
λ̇ = ρλ− λ(1− τ)r. (5)
From the household’s maximization of equation (1) subject to equation (2), we get
Ċ =
{(1− τ)r− ρ}C
σ
(6)
and the transversality condition limt→∞ e
−ρ·tAt · λt = 0.
The productive sector is represented by one firm that behaves competitively, i.e. taking the
interest rate as given. In addition, the representative firm maximizes static profits. The
production function of the firm is given by
Y = Kα(LKg)
1−α, (7)
with α < 1.
α is the private capital share and (1− α) gives the labour share. Kg denotes stock of infras-
tructure and reflects the external effects. Kg is labour augmenting. The production function
satisfies the standard neoclassical characteristics, particularly the constant returns to scale
with respect to K and LKg. We define x = K/Kg, kg = Kg/Y and ω = (1− α)xα.
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Using that labour is normalized to one, perfect competition and profit maximization yields
w = (1− α)KαK1−αg , (8)
r = αKα−1K1−αg . (9)
Resorting to equations (4), (5) and (8), (9), which must hold in equilibrium, the growth rate
of consumption is derived as
Ċ
C
=
1
σ
{(1− τ)αKα−1K1−αg − ρ}. (10)
The growth rate of consumption is determined exogenously and thus constant.
2.2 The government
The government in our economy receives tax revenues from income taxation and has revenues
from issuing government bonds. Further, the government sets the primary surplus such that
it is a positive linear function of public debt which guarantees that public debt is sustainable,
as in Greiner & Fincke (2015).
The accounting identity describing the accumulation of public debt in continuous time is given
by:
Ḃ = rB − S, (11)
where B stands for real public debt (real public net debt), r is the real world interest rate (as
above), and S is real government surplus exclusive of interest payments.
The intertemporal budget constraint of the government is fulfilled if
lim
t→∞
e−r·tB(t) = 0 (12)
holds, which is the no-Ponzi game condition (see e.g. Blanchard & Fischer (1989)).
Now, assume that the ratio of the primary surplus to GDP is a positive linear function of the
debt-to-GDP ratio and of a constant.
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The primary surplus ratio, then, can be written as
S
Y
= φ+ ψ
B
Y
, (13)
where Y is the gross domestic income and φ ∈ R , ψ ∈ R++ are constants. The parameter ψ
determines how strongly the primary surplus reacts to changes in public debt and therefore,
can be considered as a feedback parameter of public debt2. This feedback parameter of public
debt can vary over time, but has to be positive on average and greater than the difference
between the world interest rate and the growth rate of GDP, so that the debt-to-GDP ratio
converges to a constant.
φ determines whether the level of the primary surplus rises or falls with an increase in GDP.
Using that equation the differential equation describing the evolution of public debt can be
written as
Ḃ = (r− ψ)B − φY. (14)
From Greiner & Fincke (2015) we know that, given the rule assumed in equation (13), a
positive linear dependence of the primary surplus to GDP ratio on the debt ratio on average,
guarantees that the intertemporal budget constraint of the government is met. Further,
Greiner & Fincke (2015) shows that there is empirical evidence that developed countries raise
their primary surplus as public debt rises. Therefore, we consider that the government sets
the primary surplus according to (13) implying that public debt is sustainable, so that the
evolution of public debt is given by (14). In principle, public debt could be negative signifying
that the government is creditor. In this paper, however, we assume throughout that public
debt is positive. In (13), the primary surplus is not only determined by public debt, it also
depends on the level of GDP in a country which capture the total tax revenue and temporary
government spending. Still sustainability of public debt is independent of the effect of GDP
on the primary surplus as long as the primary surplus is a positive linear function of public
debt.
To construct infrastructure, the government makes public investments. The amount of public
investments is denoted by G. Then, stock of infrastructure accumulates according to K̇g = G.
2If ψ takes a large (small) value, the government adjusts b = BY at a fast (slow) pace.
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We define g = G
Y
. As stated in the beginning, the government finances its expenditure in two
ways, by levying an income tax and by issuing bonds.
Thus, the budget constraint of the government can be written as
rB +G = Ḃ + τ(r · A+ w). (15)
Since the government sticks to the rule defined in equation (13), the government adjusts its
debt-GDP ratio, b = B
Y
, according to the following rule derived from (14)
ḃ = (r− ψ − γ)b− φ, (16)
where γ = Ẏ
Y
is the growth rate of GDP.
The budgetary rule (13) imposes a constraint on the possibility of the government to control
public investment. This holds because a rise in public debt, for whatever reasons, implies that
public investment must decrease, for given values of the parameters φ and ψ and for a given
tax revenue. The reason is that the government must raise the primary surplus such that
a fiscal policy is sustainable when public debt rises. This leads to an internal crowding-out
effect of public debt (crowding-out of public investment as a result of public debt). The gov-
ernment conducts fiscal policy by setting the parameters φ and ψ. Certainly, the government
can also set the tax rate τ , however variations in τ have been studied frequently and therefore
we will fix this fiscal parameter.
Public debt is a state variable which evolves gradually. Over time, however, a higher deficit
implies a higher debt and the primary surplus must rise in order to keep fiscal policy sustain-
able.
In the next sections, we will study in more detail the effects of the parameters and we will
get more insights in the dynamics of the model.
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2.3 Equilibrium conditions and the (sustainable) balanced growth
path
An equilibrium allocation is defined as an allocation such that the firm maximizes profits im-
plying that factor prices equal their marginal products (equations (8) and (9)), the household
solves (1) subject to (2) and the budget constraint of the government (15) is fulfilled with the
primary surplus set according to (13).
A sustainable balanced growth path (SBGP) is defined as a path where the economy is in
equilibrium and on which the following endogenous variables grow at the same strictly pos-
itive constant growth rate, i.e. K̇/K = Ċ/C = Ȧ/A holds, and the intertemporal budget
constraint of the government is fulfilled, that is equation (12) must hold. Note that the SBGP
is dynamically efficient3 and the transversality condition of the household is fulfilled. Since
we have posited that the government sets the primary surplus according to (13) with ψ > 0
any path which satisfies K̇/K = Ċ/C = Ȧ/A = Ḃ/B is associated with a sustainable public
debt. To make this clear we speak of a sustainable balanced growth path.
To analyze our economy around a SBGP we define the new variables c = C/Y and a = A/Y .
Here, Y is given by equation (7), Kg is a state variable, and L = 1 holds in equilibrium. We
then have to treat Y as a predetermined variable. Then, a and b are state variables and c is
a jump variable. From (7) and K̇g = G, we have g = kgγ. From (2), (6), (8), (15) and the
definitions of I and γ, we obtain
ḃ = (r− γ)b+ g − τ(r · a+ ωkg), (17)
ȧ = {(1− τ)r − γ}a− c+ (1− τ)ωkg, (18)
ċ =
{
(1− τ)r − ρ
σ
− γ
}
c. (19)
Defining the debt-GDP ratio as b = B
Y
, we merge the evolution of the public debt-GDP ratio,
ḃ, resulting from equation (14), and the evolution of the debt-GDP ratio, ḃ, coming from (15).
3The world interest rate exceeds the growth rate of GDP on average.
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Solving for γ using g = kgγ, we obtain
γ(=
g
kg
) =
τ(ra+ ωkg)− ψb− φ
kg
= γ(a, b, ·). (20)
This equation shows that the parameters ψ and φ have an impact on γ in the short run.
Substituting equation (20) into (18) and (19), a three dimensional system of differential
equations with its initial values b(0) and a(0) for t = 0 is given by
ḃ = (r− ψ − γ)b− φ, (21)
ȧ = {(1− τ)r − γ(a, b, ·)}a− c+ (1− τ)ωkg, (22)
ċ =
{
(1− τ)r − ρ
σ
− γ(a, b, ·)
}
c. (23)
A solution of ḃ = ȧ = ċ = 0 with respect to b, a, c gives a SBGP for this model and the
corresponding ratios b?, a?, c? on the SBGP.
To get insight into our model we derive the ratios b?, a?, c? on the SBGP by solving simulta-
neously the three dimensional system of differential equations. Here, we set ċ/c = 0 to get a
c? 6= 0. As the analytical model turns out to become complex, we just state
b? =
σφ
r(σ + τ − 1) + ρ− σψ
, (24)
γ? =
(1− τ)r − ρ
σ
. (25)
a? and c? on the SBGP exist. To ensure positive growth, we assume that γ? = (1−τ)r−ρ
σ
> 0.
The policy parameters ψ and φ have no effects on the long-run growth rate, γ?.
We see that b? contains γ? and we can rewrite b? by
b? =
φ
r − γ? − ψ
. (26)
13
From this expression, we can see that in the case φ < 0, to get a positive b?, the feedback
parameter of public debt ψ has to be larger than the difference between r and γ?, this means
ψ > r − γ?. In the case φ > 0, ψ < r − γ? must hold to get a positive b?.
b on the SBGP can be positive or negative since it is an endogenous variable. However, from
an economic point of view a positive value of government debt is more realistic since most
countries are characeterized by debt. So, we assume that the government is a debtor, that is
b > 0 holds.
To examine the stability of the unique SBGP, we linearize the three dimensional system of
differential equations around the SBGP characterized by b?, a?, c? and γ?, and then we obtain

ḃ
ȧ
ċ
 =

r − ψ(1− b?
kg
)− γ? − τr
kg
b? 0
ψ
kg
a? (1− τ)r − τr
kg
a? − γ? −1
ψ
kg
c? − τr
kg
c? 0


b− b?
a− a?
c− c?

Thanks to the Jacobian Matrix with SBGP values we determine the eigenvalues, the deter-
minant and the trace of this Jacobian Matrix and thus indicate the stability of the SBGP.
In this context, it is crucial to indicate the growth rate of the asset holdings of the household
and the growth rate of public debt that are given by
Ȧ
A
= (1− τ) · (αKα−1K1−αg ) +
(1− τ) · (1− α)
a
− c
a
, (27)
Ḃ
B
= ((αKα−1K1−αg )− ψ)−
φ
b
. (28)
We see that the growth rate of the asset holdings of the household is influenced by the variables
a and c and the growth rate of public debt is affected by the variable b and by the policy
parameters ψ and φ, in the short run. Fluctuations of the variables b, a, c have an impact on
these growth rates. We have taken the model from Morimoto et al. (2017) and have integrated
the sustainable debt policy rule presented for instance in Greiner & Fincke (2015). In the
next section, we analyze this model with the sustainable debt policy rule used to investigate
two different scenarios and study the effects on the SBGP.
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3 Model Analysis: Debt policies on the SBGP
To analyze our model further, we resort to simulations. We do so because the analytical
model turns out to become too complex to derive further results. As a benchmark for our
simulations we set the income tax rate to thirty percent, i.e. τ = 0.3, the private capital share
is also set to thirty percent, i.e. α = 0.3. The household’s rate of time preference is set to 1.5
percent ρ = 0.015. Interpreting one time period as 3 (5, 10) years then gives an annual rate
of time preference of 0.5 (0.3, 0.15) percent. The world interest rate is set to r = 0.05. Those
parameters are left unchanged throughout our simulations. We only change the parameter σ
and the policy parameters ψ and φ.
In the tables we report the results of our simulations for values of σ in combination with
values for the policy parameters ψ and φ. The long-run growth rate, γ? is indicated and
b?, a?, c? are also stated. Unstable means that at least two eigenvalues are positive or have
positive real parts.
3.1 Balanced Government Budget
To model the balanced budget rule, we set φ = 0 and ψ = r. From equation (14) one
immediately realizes that this implies Ḃ = 0, that is a balanced budget which indicates that
the debt-to-GDP ratio converges to zero in the long-run. Such a situation is sustainable
and we can even speak of strong sustainability in this case since the government balances
its budget. It should be noted that the debt-to-GDP ratio asymptotically converges to zero
(Greiner & Fincke, 2015). Setting Ḃ = 0 implies that the ratio of public debt to GDP equals
zero on the SBGP, i.e. b? = 0 holds. Applying the parameter setting stated above with
σ = 2, φ = 0 and ψ = r, we see that there exists a unique SBGP for the balanced budget
scenario. We get the following values for b? = 0, as stated above due to Ḃ = 0, a? = −13.691
and c? = 0.148. The positive c? states that on the SBGP for the balanced budget scenario
we have a positive ratio of consumption to GDP and the negative a? signifies that on the
SBGP the ratio of asset holdings of the household to GDP is negative, which means that
foreign agents hold some fractions of private capital or government bonds of the household,
i.e. the household is indebted abroad. As the policy parameters ψ and φ have no effects on
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the long-run growth rate, γ?, for the stated parameter setting with σ = 2, we get γ? = 0.01.
To analyze stability of the SBGP, we calculate the eigenvalues of the Jacobian evaluated at
the sustainable balanced growth path. We then see that the unique sustainable balanced
growth path is saddle point stable (one positive and two negative eigenvalues).
We recall that the balanced budget scenario implies ψ = r so that a high value for r implies
a high value for ψ, too. Now, applying the parameter setting stated above with σ = 0.7,
φ = 0 and ψ = r, we see that there exists a unique SBGP for the balanced budget scenario.
We get the following values for b? = 0, as stated above due to Ḃ = 0, a? = −13.116 and
c? = 0.406. The positive c? states that on the SBGP for the balanced budget scenario we
have a positive ratio of consumption to GDP and the negative a? signifies that on the SBGP
the ratio of asset holdings of the household to GDP is negative which means that the household
is indebted abroad. As the policy parameters ψ and φ have no effects on the long-run growth
rate, γ?, for the stated parameter setting with σ = 0.7, we get γ? = 0.029. We see that the
unique sustainable balanced growth path is saddle point stable (one positive and two negative
eigenvalues).
For the parameter setting with σ < 1, our model generates a higher growth rate of GDP
on the SBGP, a higher a? and a higher c? for the BGB-scenario compared to the parameter
setting with σ > 1 for the the BGB-scenario. Next, we study our model where the government
has permanent public deficits.
3.2 Permanent Public Deficits
In this subsection, we allow permanent public deficits where the government debt grows at
the same rate as all other endogenous variables in the long-run. Since the government sets
the primary surplus according to equation (13) it does not play a Ponzi game in this case but
fulfills the intertemporal budget constraint. This situation can be called weak sustainability
since it only guarantees that the government does not play a Ponzi game but public debt
grows at the same rate as GDP in the long-run, i.e. Ḃ/B = K̇/K = Ċ/C = Ȧ/A = γ?
holds (Greiner & Fincke, 2015). We limit the analysis to the case ψ > 0, in order to not
violate the intertemporal budget constraint of the government along a balanced growth path
(see Greiner & Fincke (2015)). In equation (26) and its explanations, we can identify how
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the policy parameters ψ and φ have effects on the debt-to-GDP ratio on the SBGP. As the
model becomes rather complex, such that it is difficult to gain analytical results, we resort to
simulations in order to gain insights into our model economy.
We study how public debt policy via the reaction coefficient ψ affects the main indicators on
the SBGP and the stability of the SBGP.
Table 1: Reaction coefficient ψ and its b?, a? and c? on the SBGP for the stated parameter
setting with σ = 2 and φ = −0.04
σ = 2 φ = −0.04
ψ b? a? c? γ? Stability
ψ = 0.01 -1.333 -17.246 0.059 0.01 Real Eigenvalues (+,+,-)
ψ = 0.02 -2. -19.024 0.014 0.01 Real Eigenvalues (+,+,-)
ψ = 0.03 -4. -24.357 0.119 0.01 Eigenvalues
(0.554+0i, 0.005 ±0.007i)
ψ = 0.04 Complex −2.951 ∗ 1016 Complex 0.01 not solvable
ψ = 0.1 0.667 -11.913 0.192 0.01 Eigenvalues
(0.545+0i, -0.026 ±0.0053i)
ψ = 0.2 0.25 -13.024 0.1644 0.01 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,-)
ψ = 1 0.042 -13.58 0.151 0.01 Real Eigenvalues (-,+,-)
ψ = 11 0.004 -13.681 0.148 0.01 Real Eigenvalues (-,+,-)
Table 1 shows how b?, a?, c?, γ? and the stability of the SBGP react when the government
changes the reaction coefficient ψ, that means when it changes the weight on stabilizing public
debt, where σ = 2, φ = −0.04 are set. Even if we assumed that public debt is positive, for
the sake of completeness and to understand the system, in table 1 we consider b? < 0.
As stated above, table 1 demonstrates that the policy parameters ψ and φ have no effects on
the long-run growth rate, γ? and therefore γ? does not change when increasing the reaction
coefficient ψ. Of course, b? declines as the government puts more weight on stabilizing public
debt, that is when it increases the reaction coefficient ψ but only under b? > 0. We can also
see that under b? > 0, raising the reaction coefficient ψ implies a decrease of c?. The economic
mechanism behind that result is that a stricter public debt policy leads to less consumption
in the economy on the SBGP. Table 1 shows that under b? > 0, raising the reaction coefficient
ψ reduces a?. A negative a? states that on the SBGP the ratio of asset holdings of the
household to GDP is negative, signifying that foreign agents hold some fractions of private
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capital or government bonds of the household, i.e. the household is indebted abroad. Under
b? > 0, a higher reaction coefficient of the government ψ leads to a lower a?, therefore to
more influence of foreign agents on the asset holdings of the household on the SBGP. If
the government puts more weight on stabilizing public debt, on the SBGP the ratio of asset
holdings of the household to GDP becomes smaller due to higher negative foreign assets which
means that the ratio is affected by higher influence of foreign agents.
For each ψ with the given parameter values, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix evaluated
at the sustainable balanced growth path of the system are calculated and the stabilities of the
SBGP are indicated. In table 1 we can observe that if ψ = r−γ?, the system cannot be solved
which is also observable in equation (26). Analyzing the eigenvalues of each ψ with the given
parameter setting, in table 1 we can see that the economy is stable with one pair of complex
conjugate eigenvalues and one positive real eigenvalue for some specific values of ψ. For the
given parameter setting and between ψ = 0.041 and ψ = 0.0415, there is the possibility that
the real part of the pair of complex conjugate eigenvalues equals zero, since between these
two ψ-values we can identify a change of sign of the real part of the pair of complex conjugate
eigenvalues. We realize that for 0.041 < ψcrit < 0.0415 the SBGP undergoes a subcritical
Hopf bifurcation and leads to unstable limit cycles. For a slightly different value of σ, the
model reacts in a sensitive way with respect to σ, namely for σ = 2.01, a supercritical Hopf
bifurcation can be observed for ψ = ψcrit = 0.041525 which leads to stable limit cycles since
the first Lyapunov coefficient L1 is negative, L1 = −2.805939e − 001. In this case, there
exists an interval of values of ψ with strictly positive measure for which the economy does not
converge to the SBGP but converges to persistent cycles. From an economic point of view,
this means that the economy is characterized by sustained fluctuations around the SBGP and
that the economy is not characterized by a constant growth rate at which all variables grow
but the growth rates are cyclically fluctuating over time.
Figure 1 shows the limit cycle in the (b-c-ψ) phase space for this specific interval of ψ-values
where we can see that increasing the reaction coefficient ψ implies a decrease of consumption
in the economy and naturally it reduces public debt, if public debt-to-GDP ratio is positive.
When the public debt-to-GDP ratio has fallen enough for a specific ψ value and consumption
relative to GDP has been reduced, public investment rises again that increases the debt-to-
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Figure 1: Stable limit cycle in the (b-c-ψ) phase space for σ = 2.01
GDP ratio of the government, increases the consumption relative to GDP ratio and spurs
economic growth. This generates a cyclical evolution and generates the limit cycle for this
specific interval of ψ-values. To conduct the respective policy rule, ψ is fixed and is not varied,
but b and c fluctuate over time to their new SBGP-values.
We note from table 1 that after the (unstable) limit cycle, with a higher ψ value, we get a
stable SBGP. For ψ values higher than ψcrit and with some distance from this ψcrit value,
the SBGP becomes stable. As described in Greiner & Fincke (2015), the reaction coefficient
should be positive, sufficiently large on average and should exceed the positive difference
between the interest rate and the GDP growth rate on average to guarantee that the debt-
to-GDP ratio converges to a constant. The debt-to-GDP ratio should remain bounded in the
long-run due to the primary surplus which cannot become larger than GDP.
In the appendix, we find further tables as the one described above. One with the stated
parameter setting for σ = 2 and φ = 0.04 which is not relevant due to instability of the SBGP
for b? > 0. For the same reason the table with the stated parameter setting for σ = 0.7 and
φ = 0.04 is not explained in detail. The table with the stated parameter setting for σ = 0.7
and φ = −0.04 does not give hints for (unstable/stable) limit cycles.
In section 4, we investigate the welfare effects on the sustainable balanced growth path of the
different scenarios and along the transition path.
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4 Welfare Analysis of Debt policies
In this section, we analyze the welfare effects on the SBGP of the two different scenarios:
the Permanent Public Deficits scenario (PPD-scenario) and the Balanced Government Bud-
get scenario (BGB-scenario). Furthermore, this section examines the welfare effects along
the transition path, that is the effects resulting from a transition from the Permanent Pub-
lic Deficits scenario (PPD-scenario), where public debt grows at the same rate as all other
endogenous variables in the long-run, to the Balanced Government Budget scenario (BGB-
scenario) on welfare. To get further insights of the model, we investigate it the other way
around as well, i.e. the effects resulting from a transition from the Balanced Government
Budget scenario (BGB-scenario) to the Permanent Public Deficits scenario (PPD-scenario).
To analyze the welfare effects along the transition, we assume that the economy is originally
on the SBGP when the government decides to change to the new scenario on the SBGP from
t=0 onwards. Therefor, we set the policy parameters ψ and φ as explained in section 3. In
section 3, we set φ = 0 and ψ = r = 0.05 for the BGB-scenario and for the PPD-scenario we
set φ = −0.04 and ψ = 0.2 since for these policy parameters and for once σ = 2 and then
σ = 0.7, the model yields a positive b?, is characterized by a saddle point and the Jacobian
Matrix with SBGP values above has two negative real eigenvalues (see table 1).
To investigate the effects of a change from one scenario to the other we study the solution of
the linearized system of equations (21) - (23) which is given by
b(t) = b? + C1v11e
(ev1)t + C2v21e
(ev2)t, (29)
a(t) = a? + C1v12e
(ev1)t + C2v22e
(ev2)t, (30)
c(t) = c? + C1v13e
(ev1)t + C2v23e
(ev2)t, (31)
with vjl the l-th element of the eigenvector belonging to the negative real eigenvalue evj,
j = 1, 2. Cj, j = 1, 2, are constants determined by the initial conditions a(0) and b(0).
Setting t = 0 gives Cj, j = 1, 2, as a function of a(0) and b(0). Inserting these Cj, j = 1, 2, in
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equation (31) with t = 0 gives the unique c(0) on the stable manifold leading to the SBGP
in the long-run. It is the initial value for c on the stable branch onto the saddle point.
We are interested in the following policy experiments (as explained above): First, we calculate
welfare for the different scenarios. Second, we study the question of whether switching from
the BGB-scenario to the PPD-scenario, where the debt ratio is positive in the long-run,
raises welfare. Then, as a third aim, we analyze welfare effects of switching from the PPD-
scenario, where the government runs into debt, to the BGB-scenario. By comparing these
different scenarios and transitions, it is possible to identify which scenario or which transition
is preferable to choose over the other(s), assuming this specific parameter setting in this
model.
To compute welfare effects we numerically calculate the expression
F = max
C(t)
∫ +∞
0
(
C(t)1−σ − 1
1− σ
)
e−ρ·t dt. (32)
We remember that c(0) = C(0)
Y
= C(0)
xαKg(0)
, where we set Kg(0) = 1. We get c(0) from the
solution of the linearized system of equations (21) - (23), which is given above by equations
(29)-(31). In the beginning, we defined xα, thus we can solve for C(0), the value for consump-
tion at t = 0.
From equation (32) we see that the welfare effects depend on the parameter σ, the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution of consumption of the household. Hence, we once set σ < 1 and
then σ > 1. In doing so, we have to take into account the following (limiting transversality)
condition of the household: ρ > γ? · (1− σ).
Now, we compute equation (32) for the different scenarios and transitions with the particular
parameter setting (once σ = 2 and then σ = 0.7).
Table 2: Welfare in PPD-scenario and welfare resulting from a transition to BGB-scenario
for σ = 2.
PPD-scenario From PPD-scenario to BGB-scenario
F −46.2259 −123.383
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Table 3: Welfare in BGB-scenario and welfare resulting from a transition to PPD-scenario
for σ = 2.
BGB-scenario From BGB-scenario to PPD-scenario
F −58.962 50.0439
Table 4: Welfare in PPD-scenario and welfare resulting from a transition to BGB-scenario
for σ = 0.7.
PPD-scenario From PPD-scenario to BGB-scenario
F 276.578 202.338
Table 5: Welfare in BGB-scenario and welfare resulting from a transition to PPD-scenario
for σ = 0.7.
BGB-scenario From BGB-scenario to PPD-scenario
F 275.822 495.988
The tables report the outcomes of the policy experiments. When analyzing the transi-
tions, we switch from the sustainable balanced growth path of one scenario to the sustainable
balanced growth path of the other scenario. As to the parameter values we use for the differ-
ent scenarios the parameter setting as stated above, as an example for σ = 0.5 the limiting
transversality condition of the household is not fulfilled, thus we use once σ = 2 and then
σ = 0.7.
The tables show that independent of the parameter σ, which we once set greater and then
smaller one, the PPD-scenario, where public debt grows at the same rate as all other endoge-
nous variables in the long-run, leads to higher welfare than the welfare of the BGB-scenario.
Thus, it is shown as well that the transition from the PPD-scenario to the BGB-scenario
brings the smallest welfare.
The reason for this outcome is that the level of consumption at t = 0 in the BGB-scenario
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is less than in the PPD-scenario. Since the policy parameters ψ and φ do not affect the
growth rate of GDP on the sustainable balanced growth path, γ?, none of the scenarios leads
to a higher growth rate of GDP on the sustainable balanced growth path, i.e. referring to
γ?, permanent public deficits or accumulating a stock of debt do not have a negative effect
for the government. γ? is not influenced by consumption. The real world interest rate, r, is
exogenous and determines with other parameters γ?. Changing the scenarios does not show
any reaction of the growth rate of GDP on the sustainable balanced growth path.
As well, we identify that in the PPD-scenario, b? > 0, c? on the SBGP is greater than in the
BGB-scenario. This is also the case for a? on the SBGP, i.e. it is greater in the PPD-scenario
than in the BGB-scenario. This means that foreign agents hold less fractions of private capital
or government bonds of the household in the PPD-scenario under the SBGP. If the govern-
ment holds permanent public deficits, the household is less indebted abroad under the SBGP.
The policy parameters ψ and φ have an impact on b?, c? and a? on the SBGP. Therefore,
if these policy parameters rise, which is the case for the PPD-scenario, not only b? rises but
also c? and a?. Since we set φ = 0 and ψ = r = 0.05 for the BGB-scenario and for the
PPD-scenario we set φ = −0.04 and ψ = 0.2 (once σ = 2 and then σ = 0.7), we get higher
values in the PPD-scenario compared to the BGB-scenario.
By far, the highest welfare is achieved by switching from the BGB-scenario to the PPD-
scenario. We identify that the level of consumption at t = 0 is here higher than in the other
policy experiments and higher than in the previous BGB-scenario on the SBGP. It is even
greater than 1, c(0) > 1, which states that at t = 0, consumption C is greater than GDP,
Y . At t = 0, the consumption comes into the economy from abroad, as the economy is small
and open, this is possible. c is a jump variable and the unique c(0) on the stable manifold
leads to the SBGP in the long-run. It is the initial value for c on the stable branch onto the
saddle point. Later, the consumption reduces and adapts to the c? on the SBGP of the new
PPD-scenario.
Another possibility to analyze welfare of the debt policies is the equivalent variation expressed
in relative consumption units, i.e. the maximum amount a consumer would be willing to pay
to avoid the change of policy, which is calcuated by (C(0)new−C(0)old)
C(0)old
. Setting as C(0)new, the
C(0) of the transition from the BGB-scenario to the PPD-scenario and as C(0)old, the C(0)
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of the BGB-scenario on the SBGP, then we get the value 0.07% for σ = 2 and then 0.02%
for σ = 0.7. Therefore, we identify that the maximum amount which the consumer would be
willing to pay to avoid the change of policy is less than 0.1% for the both σ-values.
Taking for a(0) and b(0) arbitrary randomly chosen initial condition that are not too far
away from the SBGP values of the new scenario, i.e. a situation of randomly chosen initial
debt and household assets to each scenario, we also find out that the PPD-scenario performs
better than the BGB-scenario with respect to welfare, independently of σ. For an extended
robustness analysis, we analze the model with a changed parameter setting that can be found
in the appendix, and then we get from a qualitative point of view, the same outcomes which
confirms the results above. As the PPD-scenario fulfills the intertemporal budget constraint
of the government and with the policy parameters ψ and φ changes the primary surplus ratio
according to equation (13), it is a sustainable policy scenario associated with a sustainable
public debt.
Combining the budget constraint of the household with that of the government gives the
economy-wide resource constraint
Y + r · FA = G+ C + K̇ + ˙FA (33)
In this small open economy model, the revenues through GDP and the product of the world
interest rate and foreign assets4 are used for public investments, consumption, the accumula-
tion of private capital and of foreign assets. To understand the mechanism of this model the
combination of equation (14) and equation (15) gives the following
G = τ(r · A+ w)− ψB − φY (34)
From equation (34) we can see that if the real public debt (real public net debt), B, increases
which is the case in the PPD-scenario, the government reacts due to equation (13), the
feedback of the government, by reducing the amount of public investments, G5. Hence,
equation (33) could give insights why C (C(0)) rises in the PPD-scenario when the amount
4i.e. foreign agents have to pay the world interest rate on the fractions of private capital or government
bonds that they own
5The income tax rate is fixed.
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of public investments, G, is reduced.
In this section 4, we studied the welfare effects on the sustainable balanced growth path
of the different scenarios and along the transition path. We identified that the Permanent
Public Deficits scenario performs better with regard to welfare than the Balanced Government
Budget scenario. The highest welfare for a specific parameter setting is achieved by switching
from the BGB-scenario to the PPD-scenario. Nevertheless, as every model, this one has its
limitations and assumptions, as stated above, that have effects on the results. Therefore,
one should take care when interpreting the results. As an example, we have not taken into
account uncertainty or risk premium.
5 Conclusion
This paper contributes a small open economy model of endogenous growth with public capital
accumulation which analyzes sustainable debt policy rules and economic growth by investi-
gating the dynamics, the characteristics and stability of the steady state, the welfare effects
on the SBGP and along the transition path of the different debt policies scenarios (Balanced
Government Budget and Permanent Public Deficits). Higher public debt induces the govern-
ment to raise the primary surplus that is a positive linear function of the debt-to-GDP ratio
guaranteeing that public debt is sustainable. This assumption results from empirical studies
that identify an increase of the ratio of the primary surplus to GDP as the debt ratio rises.
From the economy, consisting of a household sector, a productive sector and the government,
we get the following results:
Assuming constant tax rates, we demonstrate for the specific parameter setting that in the
BGB-scenario a unique SBGP that is always saddle point stable is generated. In the PPD-
scenario, we also get a unique SBGP, independent of the governmental reaction to higher
public debt. However, in this PPD-scenario, stability is only given if the feedback parame-
ter of public debt is sufficiently large (see table 1). We have seen that higher values of the
feedback parameter of public debt tend to stabilize the economy. A reduction of this ψ value
can lead to a loss of stability and for the parameter setting in the Permanent Public Deficits
scenario, we identify that for certain critical values of that ψ value the model generates en-
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dogenous growth cycles/limit cycles via a Hopf bifurcation. This means that the economy
is characterized by cyclical growth rates and not by a constant balanced growth rate. The
policy parameters ψ and φ have no effects on the long-run growth rate, γ? and therefore γ?
does not change when increasing the reaction coefficient ψ. γ? is determined by the real world
interest rate, r, which is exogenous and by other parameters.
As regards welfare, we investigate the welfare effects on the sustainable balanced growth path
of the different scenarios and we examine the welfare effects along the transition path, that
is the effects resulting from a transition from one scenario to the other scenario. We show
that the Permanent Public Deficits scenario yields a higher value for welfare than the Bal-
anced Government Budget scenario. The highest welfare for this specific parameter setting is
achieved by switching from the BGB-scenario to the PPD-scenario.
Still, as the PPD-scenario fulfills the intertemporal budget constraint of the government and
with the policy parameters ψ and φ changes the primary surplus ratio according to equation
(13), it is a sustainable policy scenario.
An integration of monetary policy or migration in this model would be interesting to analyze
current politico-economic questions and challenges.
26
Appendix
Reaction coefficient ψ and its b?, a? and c? on the SBGP for the stated parameter setting
with σ = 2 and φ = 0.04
σ = 2 φ = 0.04
ψ b? a? c? γ? Stability
ψ = 0.01 1.333 -10.135 0.237 0.01 Real Eigenvalues (+,+,-)
ψ = 0.02 2. -8.357 0.281 0.01 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,+)
ψ = 0.03 4. -3.024 0.414 0.01 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,+)
ψ = 0.035 8. 7.643 0.681 0.01 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,+)
ψ = 0.04 Complex 2.951 ∗ 1016 Complex 0.01 not solvable
ψ = 0.041 -40. -120,357 -2,519 0.01 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,+)
ψ = 0.0415 -26.667 -84.802 -1.630 0.01 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,+)
ψ = 0.1 -0.667 -15.468 0.103 0.01 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,-)
ψ = 0.2 -0.25 -14.357 0.131 0.01 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,-)
ψ = 11 -0.004 -13.700 0.148 0.01 Real Eigenvalues (-,+,-)
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Reaction coefficient ψ and its b?, a? and c? on the SBGP for the stated parameter setting
with σ = 0.7 and φ = −0.04
σ = 0.7 φ = −0.04
ψ b? a? c? γ? Stability
ψ = 0.005 -2.435 -16.595 0.383 0.03 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,+)
ψ = 0.01 -3.5 -18.116 0.374 0.03 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,+)
ψ = 0.02 -28 -53.116 0.149 0.03 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,+)
ψ = 0.021 -93.333 -146.45 -0.451 0.03 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,-)
ψ = 0.025 11.2 2.884 0.509 0.03 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,-)
ψ = 0.027 7.18 -2.86 0.472 0.03 Eigenvalues
(0.536+0i, -0.012±0.002i)
ψ = 0.03 4.667 -6.45 0.448 0.03 Eigenvalues
(0.535+0i, -0.014±0.007i)
ψ = 0.04 2.154 -10.04 0.425 0.03 Eigenvalues
(0.534+0i, -0.018 ±0.012i)
ψ = 0.05 1.4 -11.116 0.419 0.03 Eigenvalues
(0.533+ 0i, -0.022 ±0.015i)
ψ = 0.1 0.509 -12.389 0.410 0.03 Eigenvalues
(0.526+0i, -0.044 ±0.005i)
ψ = 0.2 0.224 -12.796 0.408 0.03 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,-)
ψ = 0.3 0.144 -12.911 0.407 0.03 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,-)
ψ = 0.5 0.084 -12.997 0.406 0.03 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,-)
ψ = 0.9 0.046 -13.051 0.406 0.03 Real Eigenvalues (-,+,-)
Reaction coefficient ψ and its b?, a? and c? on the SBGP for the stated parameter setting
with σ = 0.7 and φ = 0.04
σ = 0.7 φ = 0.04
ψ b? a? c? γ? Stability
ψ = 0.01 3.5 -8.116 0.438 0.03 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,+)
ψ = 0.02 28 26.884 0.663 0.03 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,+)
ψ = 0.03 -4.667 -19.783 0.363 0.03 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,-)
ψ = 0.05 -1.4 -15.116 0.392 0.03 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,-)
ψ = 0.1 -0.5091 -13.844 0.401 0.03 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,-)
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Different parameter setting: r = 0.035, τ = 0.2, ρ = 0.02, α = 0.3
Reaction coefficient ψ and its b?, a? and c? on the SBGP for a different parameter setting
with σ = 0.9 and φ = −0.04
σ = 0.9 φ = −0.04
ψ b? a? c? γ? Stability
ψ = 0.01 -2.483 -28.755 0.010 0.009 Real Eigenvalues (+,+,-)
ψ = 0.02 -6.545 -43.91 -0.279 0.009 Eigenvalues
(0.461+0i, 0.004±0.007i)
ψ = 0.03 10.286 18.873 0.921 0.009 Eigenvalues
(0.459+0i, -0.0003±0.012i)
ψ = 0.04 2.88 -8.751 0.393 0.009 Eigenvalues
(0.457+0i, -0.004 ±0.014i)
ψ = 0.1 0.541 -17.475 0.226 0.009 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,-)
ψ = 0.2 0.23 -18.636 0.204 0.009 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,-)
ψ = 1 0.041 -19.341 0.190 0.009 Real Eigenvalues (-,+,-)
ψ = 11 0.004 -19.481 0.188 0.009 Real Eigenvalues (-,+,-)
Reaction coefficient ψ and its b?, a? and c? on the SBGP for a different parameter setting
with σ = 0.9 and φ = 0.04
σ = 0.9 φ = 0.04
ψ b? a? c? γ? Stability
ψ = 0.01 2.483 -10.233 0.364 0.009 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,+)
ψ = 0.03 -10.286 -57.862 -0.546 0.009 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,+)
ψ = 0.05 -1.674 -25.740 0.068 0.009 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,-)
ψ = 0.07 -0.911 -22.894 0.122 0.009 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,-)
ψ = 0.1 -0.541 -21.514 0.149 0.009 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,-)
ψ = 0.2 -0.23 -20.352 0.171 0.009 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,-)
ψ = 0.5 -0.084 -19.809 0.181 0.009 Real Eigenvalues (-,+,-)
ψ = 0.7 -0.059 -19.716 0.183 0.009 Real Eigenvalues (-,+,-)
ψ = 1 -0.041 -19.648 0.185 0.009 Real Eigenvalues (-,+,-)
ψ = 11 -0.004 -19.508 0.187 0.009 Real Eigenvalues (-,+,-)
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Reaction coefficient ψ and its b?, a? and c? on the SBGP for a different parameter setting
with σ = 1.5 and φ = −0.04
σ = 1.5 φ = −0.04
ψ b? a? c? γ? Stability
ψ = 0.01 -2.034 -28.317 -0.082 0.005 Real Eigenvalues (+,+,+)
ψ = 0.02 -4.138 -37.234 -0.284 0.005 Eigenvalues
(0.465+0i, 0.007±0.007i)
ψ = 0.03 120 488.875 11.641 0.005 Eigenvalues
(0.463+0i, 0.003±0.012i)
ψ = 0.04 3.871 -3.291 0.485 0.005 Eigenvalues
(0.461+0i, -0.001 ±0.014i)
ψ = 0.05 1.967 -11.359 0.303 0.005 Eigenvalues
(0.459+0i, -0.005 ±0.015i)
ψ = 0.1 0.569 -17.286 0.168 0.005 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,-)
ψ = 0.3 0.148 -19.07 0.128 0.005 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,-)
ψ = 0.5 0.085 -19.336 0.122 0.005 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,-)
ψ = 1 0.041 -19.522 0.118 0.005 Real Eigenvalues (-,+,-)
ψ = 11 0.004 -19.681 0.114 0.005 Real Eigenvalues (-,+,-)
Reaction coefficient ψ and its b?, a? and c? on the SBGP for a different parameter setting
with σ = 1.5 and φ = 0.04
σ = 1.5 φ = 0.04
ψ b? a? c? γ? Stability
ψ = 0.01 2.034 -11.077 0.309 0.005 Real Eigenvalues (+,+,-)
ψ = 0.02 4.138 -2.16 0.511 0.005 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,+)
ψ = 0.04 -3.871 -36.102 -0.258 0.005 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,+)
ψ = 0.1 -0.569 -22.107 0.059 0.005 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,-)
ψ = 0.3 -0.148 -20.324 0.099 0.005 Real Eigenvalues (+,-,-)
ψ = 0.5 -0.085 -20.057 0.105 0.005 Real Eigenvalues (-,+,-)
ψ = 1 -0.041 -19.871 0.11 0.005 Real Eigenvalues (-,+,-)
ψ = 11 -0.004 -19.712 0.113 0.005 Real Eigenvalues (-,+,-)
30
Welfare in PPD-scenario and welfare resulting from a transition to BGB-scenario for σ = 0.9.
PPD-scenario From PPD-scenario to BGB-scenario
F −10.637 −39.765
Welfare in BGB-scenario and welfare resulting from a transition to PPD-scenario for σ = 0.9.
BGB-scenario From BGB-scenario to PPD-scenario
F −14.724 107.682
Welfare in PPD-scenario and welfare resulting from a transition to BGB-scenario for σ = 1.5.
PPD-scenario From PPD-scenario to BGB-scenario
F −50.928 −97.975
Welfare in BGB-scenario and welfare resulting from a transition to PPD-scenario for σ = 1.5.
BGB-scenario From BGB-scenario to PPD-scenario
F −65.242 57.337
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